

# Extraordinary Actions and the Role of the Liquidity Reserve



# Introduction





# **Brazilian Sovereing Auctions - Introduction**


July						2025
SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
		<b>1</b> LFT(1), NTN-B(2)	2	<b>3</b> NTN-F, LTN(2)	4	5
6	7	<b>8</b> LFT(1), NTN-B(1)	9	<b>10</b> NTN-F, LTN(1)	11	12
13	14	<b>15</b> LFT(1), NTN-B(2)	16	<b>17</b> NTN-F, LTN(2)	18	19
20	21	<b>22</b> LFT(1), NTN-B(1)	23	<b>24</b> NTN-F, LTN(1)	25	26
27	28	<b>29</b> LFT(1), NTN-B(2)	30	<b>31</b> NTN-F, LTN(2)		



- auction calendar is published three months in advance.
- Bonds are typically issued as reopenings




# Challenges faced by the BNT






## **Fiscal Imbalances**









Source: BCB



## **DFPD** estatistics






Source: BNT



# Goals and instruments



## When to Intervene





# **Available Instruments**\*

Reduction of Scheduled Auctions Size	
Auction Cancellation	
Issuance of Floating Bonds	
Short Term Issuance	
Buy-backs	
Spread Auctions	

<sup>\*</sup> This is not an exhaustive list.



### **Characteristics of Intervention**

Objective is not to control interest rate levels

**Goal** => smooth abrupt shocks and restore market functionality

Buybacks are small relative to total debt stock

Preserve credibility and market functioning

Reputation is crucial



# Role of the liquidity Reserve





# The Role of the liquidity Reserve

**Main Sources** 

Gains from BRL depreciation (FX reserves)

Early BNDES debt repayments

FX profits increased liquidity reserves


Financial buffer => enables interventions

In 2020 FX reserves:

Reached ~23% of GDP

Transfer ~4.3% of GDP

# The Role of the liquidity Reserve



<sup>\*</sup> The BCB cannot easely buy bonds in the primary or secondary market => BNT must rely on a bigger liquidity reserve.

Source: BNT




# Overview of past Extraordinary Actions






# **Overview of past Extraordinary Actions**



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#### 2018

#### **Political Instability**

• BRL 24.3bn buybacks

#### 2020

#### **Covid**

- 12 auction days
- BRL 35.6bn buybacks
- institutional changes
- New LFT vertice and increased issuance rate (Weekly)
- short-term issuance

#### 2024

#### **Fiscal Imbalances**

- 3 auction days
- BRL 9.5bn buybacks

<sup>\*</sup> cancellation of traditional auctions

<sup>\*</sup> Simultanious Buy and Sell auction of Fixed Rate and Inflation-Linked bonds



# Overview of past Extraordinary Actions - COVID-19

#### **Market conditions**


- Interest rates at historic lows
  - → reduced demand for floating bonds (LFTs)
- large volumes of 6–12 month bonds
  - Increased rollover risk
    - → larger liquidity reserve needed

#### **Institutional changes**

- Bill allowed BCB to trade securities in secondary market
  - → Not triggered, but removed legal uncertainty
- BNT— BCB relationship had changed:
  - FX profit transfers no longer automatic
  - → Pandemic exception:
     transfer of FX profits to BNT
     → +4.35% of GDP



# 48-month Brazilian Interbank Deposit Rate (DI)





# **Concluding Remarks**





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BCB cannot buy bonds in the secondary or primary market

BNT must rely on liquidity reserve

Liquidity reserve

precondition for market interventions

BNT can't rely on BCB transfer as it did in the past

Extraordinary interventions help stabilize markets

Obj. is not to control interest rate levels

Goal is to smooth abrupt market shocks

Should be used sparingly and with clear communication

BNT should preserve credibility and efficient bond market

Interventions are not a substitute for fiscal adjustment and reforms

Frequent interventions



- 1 Market dependency
- 2 Strategic behavior

Higher debt



Increases risk and reduces the DMO flexibility



### **MORE INFORMATION**

**Auction Results (portuguese) Auction Schedule Investors Presentation Annual Borrowing Plan Monthly Debt Report** Annual Debt Report




# ANNEX





## **MORE INFORMATION**

FDP Profile, by index, July/2025




2025 ABP Limits % Up to 12 months					
FPD	Min	Max			
FFD	16.0	20.0			



### **MORE INFORMATION**

#### Portfolio Profile by Holder – july/25



#### Average Maturity Profile by Holder – july/25




Table 2.4

DFPD Public Securities

Holders

						(R\$ Bn)
	Dec/24		Jun/25		Jul/25	
Pensions	1,667.28	23.93%	1,750.34	23.09%	1,792.88	23.49%
Financial Institutions	2,054.66	29.49%	2,372.94	31.30%	2,385.08	31.26%
Funds	1,510.09	21.68%	1,678.37	22.14%	1,658.58	21.73%
Nonresidents	710.91	10.20%	745.90	9.84%	752.36	9.86%
Government	234.74	3.37%	227.67	3.00%	219.65	2.88%
Insurers	276.73	3.97%	277.97	3.67%	282.51	3.70%
Other	512.46	7.36%	527.88	6.96%	539.91	7.08%
Total	6,966.88	100.00%	7,581.08	100.00%	7,630.97	100.00%
Historical Data and Notes: Annex	2.7					

Source: BNT – Monthly debt Report