Coorganizado pelo IMPA/CNPq, Instituto de Matemática Pura e Aplicada, pelo EPRG/UnB, Economics and Politics Research Group e pelo CEFOR, Centro de Formação, Treinamento e Aperfeiçoamento da Câmara dos Deputados, o evento será realizado nos dias 5 a 9 de julho de 2021 de forma virtual.
O Simpósio e a Jornada têm por objetivo fomentar a discussão acadêmica em torno de temas relacionados ao sistema político brasileiro e contará com palestra de abertura do Ministro Luís Roberto Barroso do Supremo Tribunal Federal.
Consulte aqui informações adicionais sobre o evento:
The 7th Repal conference will take place on July 15- 17th, 2021 (10-4pm EST) and is being hosted virtually by Cornell University’s Einaudi Center. Accepted papers and book panels are now posted on the Repal 2021 conference site.
Repal’s annual conference provides a setting for researchers based in Latin America and outside of the region to share work-in-progress examining the political economy of Latin America. In thematic terms, scholars in the Repal network analyze the interaction among economic, political and social processes. With respect to methods of research and analysis, Repal is open and eclectic, based on a simple premise that the methods should be selected as a function of the problem to be studied rather than the reverse. This year, there will be four parallel sessions over three days.
Registration is now open! One does not need to present at Repal to attend, and we actively encourage attendance beyond those presenting. If you plan to attend, it is important to register in advance so as to receive access to the papers that will be discussed before the start of the meeting.
Please register here. (Registration payments for those who previously registered for the cancelled 2020 conference will carry over to this conference.) Registration rates for Repal 2021 are $10 for students, $30 for non-students based in Latin America, and $50 for non-students based outside Latin America. If you are facing economic hardships due to Covid, the registration fee can be waived; please contact email@example.com.
DSE SUMMER SCHOOL/CONFERENCE OPEN FOR APPLICATIONS/SUBMISSIONS
CRC/TR 224 & ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY SUMMER SCHOOL in DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL ECONOMETRICS (DSE) Household decision making and human capital in life-cycle models University of Bonn August 16, 2021 – August 22, 2021
Application deadline: March 31,2021We are pleased to announce the next event in the sequence of Econometric Society summer schools in Dynamic Structural Econometrics. The primary focus of DSE summer schools is to provide advanced PhD students with tools and “hands on” computational instruction to carry out research in applied structural microeconometrics with a strong emphasis on closely integrating economic and econometric theory in empirical work. The school covers state of the art methods for solving, simulating, and estimating dynamic programming models. We use a variety of empirical applications to illustrate how these tools and methods are combined in a sound computational science workflow. Students will present their research and have ample chance to discuss it with colleagues and lecturers.The 2021 CRC/TR 224 & Econometric Society DSE summer school consists of 5 days of lectures held in conjunction with the Dynamic Structural Econometrics Conference 2021 (August 19-20, 2021). The local partner is the CRC/TR 224 “Economic Perspectives on Societal Challenges” financed by the German Research Foundation.The theme of the Dynamic Structural Econometrics Conference 2021 (August 19-20, 2021) is “Household decision making and human capital in life-cycle models”.
The conference brings together top junior and senior researchers from the field to discuss recent advances in theoretical and applied work.Submission deadline: March 31, 2021
Lecturers of the summer school and invited conference speakers include:• Orazio Attanasio (Yale University) • Richard Blundell (University College London) • Monica Costa Dias (Institute for Fiscal Studies) • Mariacristina De Nardi (University of Minnesota) • Philipp Eisenhauer (University of Bonn) • Eric French (University of Cambridge) • Hans-Martin von Gaudecker (University of Bonn) • Fedor Iskhakov (Australian National University) • Michael Keane (University of New South Wales) • Karen Kopecky (Atlanta Fed) • Hamish Low (University of Oxford) • Robert A. Miller (Carnegie Mellon University) • John Rust (Georgetown University) • Bertel Schjerning (University of Copenhagen)
Interested students and presenters are invited to submit their applications via the website http://dseconf.org/All applicants must be a member of the Econometric Society at the time of application. To join the Society, visit http://www.econometricsociety.org.We hope to see you in Bonn in August 2021! However, due to the current uncertainty of the CoVID-19 situation and potential travel restrictions, we might need to change the setting to a hybrid event or even hold it in an entirely virtual fashion. We will make this decision closer to the date of the event.2021 DSE Organizers: Philipp Eisenhauer, Hans-Martin von Gaudecker, David Koll DSE Core organizing committee: Fedor Iskhakov, John Rust, Bertel Schjerning
30 March – Dominic Peters* “Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities” (Hosted by Marcus Pivato)
* Harvard University
1PM GMT: 10AM Montevideo, 8AM Boston, 2PM Paris, 4PM in Moscow, 10PM in Seoul, and 2AM (next day) in Auckland.
Abstract. We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to have arbitrary additive valuations over the projects. We formulate two axioms that guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters with common interests. To the best of our knowledge, all known rules for participatory budgeting do not satisfy either of the two axioms; in addition we show that the most prominent proportional rules for committee elections (such as Proportional Approval Voting) cannot be adapted to arbitrary costs nor to additive valuations so that they would satisfy our axioms of proportionality. We construct a simple and attractive voting rule that satisfies one of our axioms (for arbitrary costs and arbitrary additive valuations), and that can be evaluated in polynomial time. We prove that our other stronger axiom is also satisfiable, though by a computationally more expensive and less natural voting rule.
Special Issue of RSP in Honor of Jorge Vianna Monteiro
RSP special issue in honor of Jorge Vianna Monteiro
Professor Jorge Vianna Monteiro was the forerunner of research in Public Choice in Brazil. In his 1981 article, Economics of Public Sector Growth (Revista de Administração Pública, v.15, n.2, p.76-89) pioneered the dissemination of government analysis from this perspective.
In addition to this article, several books published, still at the time of the PNPE/IPEA program, helped to forge a vision, as James Buchanan would say, more realistic and less romantic of the government’s role.
During the 1990s, his periodic Macroeconomic Strategy letter was a regular presence in the mailbox of several researchers, economic analysts, and policymakers. The analysis of the Brazilian economy was the subject of several books and academic articles published by him in the 2000s, shortly before he retired.
His influence as a disseminator of the theory of Public Choice in Brazil is recognized and RSP is proud to launch the call for this special edition in his honor.
We hope for submissions in the following topics: (a) Jorge Vianna Monteiro’s contribution in Public Choice analysis of Brazilian government; (b) theoretical or applied Public Choice analysis; (c) theoretical or applied Constitutional Political Economy analysis. Papers that deal with Brazilian issues would be especially appreciated.
It is important to note that, for this special edition, only submissions in English will be accepted. In addition, at the time of submission, the “Special Issue Public Choice” area must be chosen.
Submissions are now open. Articles will be accepted until May 31, 2021.
For further questions specifically regarding this issue: claudio dot shikida at enap dot gov dot br. (Portuguese non-speakers can count on me with any help through the submission process)
Check additional information here: https://revista.enap.gov.br/index.php/RSP/announcement/view/33
16 March – Franz Dietrich* “Fully Bayesian Aggregation” (Hosted by Marcus Pivato)* CNRS and Paris School of Economics
1PM GMT: 8 AM New York, 2PM Paris, 4PM PM in Moscow, 10PM PM in Seoul, and 2 AM (next day) in Auckland
Abstract: Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group’s aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, and achieves only static rationality. Our characterisation of linear-geometric preference aggregation implies as corollaries a characterisation of linear value aggregation (Harsanyi’s Theorem) and a characterisation of geometric belief aggregation.
9 March – Sean Horan* “Indecisiveness in Collective Choice” (Hosted by Simona Fabrizi)*Université de Montréal 9AM GMT: 4AM Montreal, 9AM London, 10AM Paris, 12PM Moscow, 6PM Seoul & Tokyo, 10PM Auckland
Abstract: While collective decision-making does not always lead to decisive outcomes in practice, models of collective choice almost invariably rule out the possibility of indecisiveness. Taking a step to address this disconnect, I extend three prominent collective choice procedures (the top cycle, uncovered set, and Banks set) to a general setting where social comparisons may be incomplete. I provide axiomatic foundations for the three procedures in this setting—to show that indecisiveness does not undermine their fundamental appeal.