Seminário EPRG/PósECO: Laura Karpuska, Insper, sexta, 9/10/26, 12hs, Virtual

Posted on October 6, 2026 by Mauricio Bugarin

O Economics and Politics Research Group, EPRG e o Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, PPGECO, da Universidade de Brasília têm o prazer de convidá-lo(a) para o Seminário do Ciclo de Seminários 2026.2 descrito abaixo.

O ciclo de seminários 2026.2 é dedicado ao professor Stephen A. de Castro

Laura Karpuska, Insper

Political Bargaining and Government Debt

SEXTA-FEIRA, 9 DE OUTUBRO DE 2026

 12:00h-13:00h

Virtual:

https://teams.live.com/meet/9346493940152?p=DoijK6aOJDXdv9esj2

Próximos seminários: (Lista completa aqui: https://econpolrg.com/seminars/)

October 9, 2026. Seminar 6.  Online.
Laura Karpuska, Insper
Political Bargaining and Government Debt

October 16, 2026. Seminar 7. TBC
Érica Diniz, EPGE/FGV
Open finance

 October 23, 2026. Seminar 8. In person.
Daniela Freddo, ECO/UnB
Hegemonia e Hirarquia Monetária Internacional: Estados Unidos, China e BRICS em uma ordem em transformação

October 30, 2026. Seminar 9. In person.
Nathalie Gimenes, PUC-Rio
When help hurts: Unintended consequences of set-aside auctions for small firms in Brazil

Posted in Events, Opportunities, Webinar | Leave a comment

Working paper 125 available now!

Posted on September 22, 2026 by pdebritto81

Selective Conscription: Sequential Allocation under Incomplete Information in Brazil’s Military Recruitment and Retention System


Daniel Gersten Reiss

Employers in Brazilian labor courts are ordered to pay something in roughly nine of every ten adjudicated claims, and a composition is available at any time at a fraction of what a judgment costs them. Yet large employers decline to compose, claim after claim, for years. We show that this is the equilibrium of a repeated game in which a long-lived defendant faces a continuing flow of short-lived claimants who differ in the personal cost of carrying a claim. The defendant is not buying a cheaper resolution of the present claim; it is buying a public record of refusing to compose, which lengthens the expected duration of any claim brought against it and thins the flow of claims it will face in future. The mechanism requires neither divergent beliefs about the merits nor private information. Three results carry the argument. A reputation for toughness deters entry if and only if the ratio of the two values at stake is smaller than the ratio of the two delays, each measured as a discounted annuity, a condition that is automatic when compositions price at the claimant’s reservation value. Because claimants differ, deterrence is always partial and the filing rate is bounded away from zero at every reputation the defendant can attain, so the stationary outcome is persistent litigation rather than its disappearance. And permanent toughness requires the defendant’s patience to exceed a threshold that falls with the responsiveness of entry and with the speed at which the market’s record forms. We take the model to approximately 130,000 decisions of Brazil’s largest regional labor court (TRT-2, São Paulo) for 2001–2017, obtained by text mining. The corpus establishes the institutional configuration the model assumes:
court-fee waivers granted essentially automatically and held by 84.7% of claimants, no exposure of the losing claimant to the employer’s attorney fees, and contingent representation, which together produce a lottery with no losing ticket and guarantee participation at any degree of risk aversion. It also establishes the constraint that forces our definition of reputation, since an employer that disputes everything still loses most of what it disputes and cannot build a record of victories. We do not report a calibration: composition rates are not observable in a corpus of decisions, and we set out what would be needed to measure the model’s remaining objects.

Keywords: Litigation; Settlement; Labor Courts; Repeated Games; Reputation; Risk Aversion; Text Mining.
JEL Classification: K41, C72, C73, J52, K31.

———————————-

The Economics and Politics Research Group started publishing its working papers on June 12, 2013. Please check here every week for a new working paper.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Seminário EPRG/PósECO: Daniel Reiss, BCB e UnB, sexta, 25/9/26, 12hs

Posted on September 22, 2026 by Mauricio Bugarin

O Economics and Politics Research Group, EPRG e o Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, PPGECO, da Universidade de Brasília têm o prazer de convidá-lo(a) para o Seminário do Ciclo de Seminários 2026.2 descrito abaixo.

O ciclo de seminários 2026.2 é dedicado ao professor Stephen A. de Castro

Daniel G Reiss, BCB e UnB

Selective Conscription: Sequential Allocation under Incomplete Information in Brazil’s Military Recruitment and Retention System

SEXTA-FEIRA, 25 DE SETEMBRO DE 2026

 12:00h-13:00h

Sala 6-23, FACE/UnB

Presencial

Próximos seminários: (Lista completa aqui: https://econpolrg.com/seminars/)

October 2, 2026.Seminar 5. In-person.  
Lucas Maestri, EPGE/FGV
The Price of Loyalty: Budget Constraints and Ordeals.

October 9, 2026. Seminar 6.  Online.
Laura Karpuska, Insper
Political Bargaining and Government Debt

October 16, 2026. Seminar 7. TBC
Érica Diniz, EPGE/FGV
Open finance

 October 23, 2026. Seminar 8. In person.
Daniela Freddo, ECO/UnB
Hegemonia e Hirarquia Monetária Internacional: Estados Unidos, China e BRICS em uma ordem em transformação

October 30, 2026. Seminar 9. In person.
Nathalie Gimenes, PUC-Rio
When help hurts: Unintended consequences of set-aside auctions for small firms in Brazil

Posted in Events, Opportunities, Webinar | Leave a comment

Seminário EPRG/PósECO: Bernardo Mueller, ECO/UnB, sexta, 18/9/26, 12hs

Posted on September 17, 2026 by Mauricio Bugarin

O Economics and Politics Research Group, EPRG e o Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, PPGECO, da Universidade de Brasília têm o prazer de convidá-lo(a) para o Seminário do Ciclo de Seminários 2026.2 descrito abaixo.

O ciclo de seminários 2026.2 é dedicado ao professor Stephen A. de Castro

Bernardo Mueller, UnB

On the Shoulders of Scenius: Identity and Human Innovation

 (Nos ombros de Scênios: identidade e inovação humana)

SEXTA-FEIRA, 18 DE SETEMBRO DE 2026

 12:00h-13:00h

Sala 6-23, FACE/UnB

Presencial

Próximos seminários:

September 25, 2026. Seminar 4. In-person.

Daniel Reiss, ECO/UnB e BCB, Selective Conscription: Income, Incentives, and Allocation in Brazil

October 2, 2026.Seminar 5. In-person.

Lucas Maestri, EPGE/FGV

Posted in Events, Opportunities, Webinar | Leave a comment

Seminário EPRG/PósECO: Luciana Yeung, Insper, sexta, 11/9/26, 12hs

Posted on September 9, 2026 by Mauricio Bugarin

O Economics and Politics Research Group, EPRG e o Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, PPGECO, da Universidade de Brasília têm o prazer de convidá-lo(a) para o Seminário do Ciclo de Seminários 2026.2 descrito abaixo.

O ciclo de seminários 2026.2 é dedicado ao professor Stephen A. de Castro

Luciana Yeung, Insper (presencial)

Antônio B. C. Morales, Insper (virtual)

Litigation as a ‘win-win’ game: A Theoretical Perspective and Empirical Evidence from Brazilian Labor Courts

SEXTA-FEIRA, 11 DE SETEMBRO DE 2026

12:00h-13:00h

Sala 6-23, FACE/UnB

https://teams.microsoft.com/meet/214415681196843?p=ezf2bH10hNmUAUrYyu

Próximos seminários:

September 18, 2026. Seminar 3. In-person.

Bernardo Mueller, ECO/UnB, On the Shoulders of Scenius: Identity and Human Innovation (Nos ombros de Scênios: identidade e inovação humana)

September 25, 2026. Seminar 4. In-person.

Daniel Reiss, ECO/UnB e BCB, Selective Conscription: Income, Incentives, and Allocation in Brazil

October 2, 2026.Seminar 5. In-person.

Lucas Maestri, EPGE/FGV

Posted in Events, Opportunities, Webinar | Leave a comment

Working paper 124 available now!

Posted on September 8, 2026 by pdebritto81

Litigation as a ‘win-win’ game: A Theoretical Perspective and Empirical Evidence from Brazilian Labor Courts


Luciana L. Yeung

Antônio B. C. Morales

Employers in Brazilian labor courts are ordered to pay something in roughly nine of every ten adjudicated claims, and a composition is available at any time at a fraction of what a judgment costs them. Yet large employers decline to compose, claim after claim, for years. We show that this is the equilibrium of a repeated game in which a long-lived defendant faces a continuing flow of short-lived claimants who differ in the personal cost of carrying a claim. The defendant is not buying a cheaper resolution of the present claim; it is buying a public record of refusing to compose, which lengthens the expected duration of any claim brought against it and thins the flow of claims it will face in future. The mechanism requires neither divergent beliefs about the merits nor private information. Three results carry the argument. A reputation for toughness deters entry if and only if the ratio of the two values at stake is smaller than the ratio of the two delays, each measured as a discounted annuity, a condition that is automatic when compositions price at the claimant’s reservation value. Because claimants differ, deterrence is always partial and the filing rate is bounded away from zero at every reputation the defendant can attain, so the stationary outcome is persistent litigation rather than its disappearance. And permanent toughness requires the defendant’s patience to exceed a threshold that falls with the responsiveness of entry and with the speed at which the market’s record forms. We take the model to approximately 130,000 decisions of Brazil’s largest regional labor court (TRT-2, São Paulo) for 2001–2017, obtained by text mining. The corpus establishes the institutional configuration the model assumes: court-fee waivers granted essentially automatically and held by 84.7% of claimants, no exposure of the losing claimant to the employer’s attorney fees, and contingent representation, which together produce a lottery with no losing ticket and guarantee participation at any degree of risk aversion. It also establishes the constraint that forces our definition of reputation, since an employer that disputes everything still loses most of what it disputes and cannot build a record of victories. We do not report a calibration: composition rates are not observable in a corpus of decisions, and we set out what would be needed to measure the model’s remaining objects.

Keywords: Litigation; Settlement; Labor Courts; Repeated Games; Reputation;
Risk Aversion; Text Mining.

———————————-

The Economics and Politics Research Group started publishing its working papers on June 12, 2013. Please check here every week for a new working paper.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Oportunidade: Estágio de Pós-Graduação em Pesquisa no Banco Central – Até 18/9/2026

Posted on August 27, 2026 by Mauricio Bugarin

Prezados(as) aluno(as) de pós-graduação,

O Banco Central está selecionando estudantes para três vagas do Programa de Estágio de Pós-Graduação em Pesquisa (PEPP).

Os detalhes se encontram na chamada em anexo.

 

 

Posted in Events, Opportunities, Webinar | Leave a comment

IWGTEA 2026 – International Workshop on Game Theory and Economic Applications – Mensagem dos organizadores

Posted on August 26, 2026 by Mauricio Bugarin

Posted in Events, Opportunities, Webinar | Leave a comment

Oportunidade: HOJE: Impactos Econômicos do PL 4/2025, 24/8/26 (segunda), virtual

Posted on August 24, 2026 by Mauricio Bugarin

Prezados(as) professores(as) e pesquisadores(as),

Gostaríamos de convidá-los para o nosso 1º InCLE Policy Dialogue, que acontece hoje:

  • Impactos Econômicos da Proposta para o Novo Código Civil (PL 4/2025)

  • Data: hoje, 24 de agosto (segunda-feira), às 18h

  • Formato: online

  • Link de acesso: https://zoom.us/j/9082098041

A ideia é fazer do InCLE um espaço de encontro e produção em Law & Economics, reunindo pesquisa, debates acadêmicos e discussões sobre questões concretas de Direito, Economia e políticas públicas. Esta é a primeira de diversas iniciativas que serão anunciadas aos poucos.

Esperamos encontrá-los hoje!

Att,

João Vítor Jatahy

InCLE – Insper Center for Law & Economics

Posted in Events, Opportunities, Webinar | Leave a comment

Contagem regressiva: 2 dias para o International Workshop on Game Theory and Economic Applications

Posted on July 24, 2026 by Mauricio Bugarin

🔴 FALTAM 2 DIAS!

No dia 26 de julho, a FEAUSP se transforma no centro mundial da Teoria dos Jogos.

Pela primeira vez, SEIS prêmios Nobel de Economia estarão reunidos em um único evento no Brasil:

🏅 Paul Milgrom (Nobel 2020) — presencial
🏅 Roger Myerson (Nobel 2007) — presencial
🏅 Alvin Roth (Nobel 2012) — presencial
🏅 Robert Aumann (Nobel 2005) — online
🏅 Robert Wilson (Nobel 2020) — online
🏅 Eric Maskin (Nobel 2007) — online

O 4th International Workshop on Game Theory and Economic Applications (IWGTEA) é organizado pela professora emérita Marilda Sotomayor — a única brasileira a assinar um livro ao lado de um ganhador do Nobel (Alvin Roth) — e reúne também nomes como Gabrielle Demange, Ehud Kalai, Hervé Moulin e o brasileiro Aloísio Araújo.

Diferente de um congresso tradicional, o IWGTEA nasceu como uma escola: o foco é colocar estudantes de todo o mundo frente a frente com as mentes que redesenharam mercados inteiros — de sistemas de residência médica a leilões de telecomunicações.

📅 26 de julho a 2 de agosto de 2026
📍 FEAUSP — Av. Luciano Gualberto, 908, Cidade Universitária, São Paulo
🔗 Programação completa: iwgtea.fea.usp.br

Um evento histórico para a ciência brasileira. 🇧🇷

#TeoriaDosJogos #USP #FEAUSP #Economia #PrêmioNobel #IWGTEA

 

Posted in Events, Opportunities, Webinar | Leave a comment