New paper by Rodrigo Schneider: “Winners and Losers of the Ballot: Electronic vs. Traditional Paper Voting Systems in Brazil” in Latin American Politics and Society

Rodrigo Schneider (Skidmore College and EPRG) has published the paper: “Winners and Losers of the Ballot: Electronic vs. Traditional Paper Voting Systems in Brazil” in Latin American Politics and Society.

The paper shows that the introduction of electronic voting in Brazil let to a concentration of voter shares among viable candidates, away from nonviable ones.

Please check the entire paper here. The access is free for a short period. Please find the abstract below:

Scholars concur that free and fair elections are essential for proper democratic functioning, but our understanding of the political effects of democratic voting systems is incomplete. This article mitigates the gap by exploiting the gradual transformation of voting systems and ballot structures in Brazil’s 1998 executive elections to study the relationship between voting systems and viable and nonviable candidates’ vote shares, using regression discontinuity design. It finds that the introduction of electronic voting concentrated vote shares among viable candidates and thus exhibited electoral bias. We posit that this result occurred because viable candidates were better able to communicate the information that electronic voters needed to cast valid ballots than were their nonviable counterparts. The article uses survey data to demonstrate that electronic voters responded to changes in ballot design and internalized the information viable candidates made available to them.

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Working paper 101 available now!

Motivação Partidária nas Transferências Voluntárias da União: O papel do Legislativo Federal

Fernanda L. Marciniuk, Maurício S. Bugarin & Débora C. Ferreira

(UnB)

Este artigo  investiga a influência do alinhamento partidário entre atores políticos das esferas federal e municipal na determinação  das  transferências voluntárias  federais aos  municípios, com especial enfoque na identidade partidária entre deputados federais e prefeitos, a partir  do indicador de Quociente Locacional de Bendavid-Val. A análise econométrica confirma o efeito positivo e significante dessa identidade partidária, indicando o importante papel desempenhado pelos deputados federais na distribuição partidária de  transferências  intergovernamentais. A principal  contribuição  desse trabalho  é  ir  além  do  tradicional  alinhamento  entre  prefeito e Presidente  da  República  e  investigar  o  papel  dos  parlamentares  federais  na  distribuição partidárias das transferências voluntárias.

Palavras Chaves: Transferências Voluntárias; Convênios Públicos; Quociente Locacional de Bendavid-Val; Identificação partidária; Transferências partidárias do Legislativo.

 

The Economics and Politics Research Group started publishing its working papers on June 12, 2013. Please check here every week for a new working paper.

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Working paper 100 available now!

The Paradox of Concessions in Developing Countries: A game-theoretic investigation of airport concessions in Brazil

Mauricio Bugarin (UnB) & Frederico Ribeiro (ANAC)

 

After a first wave of privatizations in Latin America in the 1980s, the return of conservative governments in the region points to a renewed cycle of concessions. This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of airport concessions that explicitly takes into account the two distinct, interacting phases of the concession mechanism: the concession auction and the operation game. The concession contract sets an investment to be made during operation, but the concessionaire may benefit from underinvesting and renegotiating the concession contract with the regulator. The paper shows that the weaker a country’s institutions are, the higher is the probability of underinvestment, and the higher are the auction equilibrium concession fees. This is the “Paradox of Concession”: the more successful the auction is, the less likely the operation will be effective. This research proposes a new mechanism based on benefits for investment rather than punishment for underinvestment with the following properties: It is efficient; frees the government from the weak-institutions problem; increases auction bids; eliminates the “paradox of concessions”; and can be fine-tuned to reduce the likelihood of underinvestment.

Keywords: Game theory, applied mechanism design, airport concession, privatization in Latin America.

 

The Economics and Politics Research Group started publishing its working papers on June 12, 2013. Please check here every week for a new working paper.

 

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HOJE: Segundo e último dia do 7o. EPRG

Atenção: Não percam hoje o segundo dia do Sétimo Encontro Anual do EPRG!

Vejam o convite e o programa ATUALIZADO EM 15.12.2019 abaixo, ou clique aqui.

 

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Contagem regressiva: 1 dia para o 7o. EPRG

Atenção: Falta apenas 1 dia para o início do Sétimo Encontro Anual do EPRG.

Vejam o convite e o programa ATUALIZADO EM 15.12.2019 abaixo, ou clique aqui.

 

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Contagem regressiva: 7 dias para o 7o. EPRG

Atenção: Faltam 7 dias para o início do Sétimo Encontro Anual do EPRG.

Vejam o convite e o programa detalhado abaixo, ou clique aqui.

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Seminário EPRG: KAZUHIRO HARA (EPGE-FGV), Sexta 6/12/2019, 12h FACE/UnB


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